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If citizens want to get rid of selfishness and gridlock in
legislatures, term limits are not the answer.
Frustrated with legislative gridlock, many commentators have suggested term limits to ensure fresh
ideas that will improve legislative efficiency. In new research which studies bill cosponsorship in 82
legislative chambers, Clint S. Swift and Kathryn A. VanderMolen  find that term limits for legislators
actually reduces bipartisan cooperation. They write that this stems from term-limited legislators’ fear
that such cooperation will harm their future career chances in other parts of government.
Frustration with gridlock and perceptions of self-serving, greedy politicians has led to skyrocketing
popularity for legislative term limits in the United States. Term limit advocates assume that new
legislators are key to introducing the fresh ideas that will improve both legislative efficiency and
reduce partisan wrangling. As a result, term limit reforms are seen as a means of alleviating partisan
gridlock and addressing urgent state problems, particularly in states with high-stakes political battles.
Do term limits actually reduce the frequency of these highly partisan, gridlocked relationships among
legislators, as proponents suggest? Our recent research indicates that, in practice, term limiting
legislators often results in legislative behavior that actively diminishes collaboration across the
political aisle. In fact, predetermining how long a politician may stay in office increases the likelihood of partisan
relationships among legislators—a finding that goes against the assumptions of term limit proponents. We show that
in term-limited legislatures, particularly in those with ample resources, members are far less likely to reach across the
aisle and participate in bipartisan bill collaboration than those who are not so limited. The fear that bipartisan
relationships will harm their future career significantly reduces the possibility of any cross-party alliance.
We believe the dampening effect of term limits on collaboration is not primarily driven by new legislators’ lack of
experience or established relationships. Instead, we argue the career uncertainty that term limits induce
fundamentally damage the likelihood of bipartisan cooperation. When individuals know their career as a legislator has
a defined end date, their decisions become influenced by perceptions of what may help, or harm, their future political
career prospects. After all, once term limited legislators get evicted from their current seat, they very frequently
compete for offices in the opposing chamber or executive branch.
Why would a legislator reduce her bipartisan behavior? How might that negatively affect a future campaign for
political office? Bipartisanship is a risky electoral strategy because it entails a potential punishment by strong
partisan voters and future campaign donors. Rather than risk being portrayed as a weak partisan, term-limited
legislators prefer to “play it safe” and turn away from collaborative opportunities with the opposing party. By choosing
a more partisan route, term-limited legislators are attempting to “package” themselves as strong partisans for the
next possible campaign, political appointment, or consulting job.
Our findings are based on bill cosponsorship data for 41 states (82 legislative chambers) compiled by LegiScanâ, a
third-party service that scrapes state legislative websites for bill information. We analyzed the propensity of legislators
to engage in bipartisan relationships by measuring the proportion of bills receiving support from at least one sponsor
in each party. This provides the general proclivity of legislators to cross the aisle when developing or rounding up
support for legislation.
Figure 1 below illustrates the collaborative differences we see in term limited and non-term limited legislatures. It also
breaks these data down by the degree of resources provided to the chamber’s membership.  The graph depicts stark
differences between term limited and non-term limited legislatures. While over 50 percent of bills receive some form
of bipartisan support in high resource, non-term limited legislatures, only a little more than 30 percent of bills do in
term-limited states. In these high resource environments, public office appears more desirable and therefore we see
stronger effects from term limits in these states. We observe a less pronounced decrease as a result of term limits
among the low resource states.
Figure 1 – State Bipartisan Bill Collaboration by Term Limited Status and Legislator Resources
This behavior has not gone unrecognized. In Florida, a term-limited state, legislators have expressed frustration over
their membership’s behavior, and journalists comment “members are more self-interested and focus on projects that
will benefit their personal political ambitions, rather than consider the long-term policy implications for the state”.
Similarly, the Sacramento Bee’s editorial board recently pleaded with members of the California Assembly to “not use
their office as a resume builder for a lucrative consulting career”.
The policy implications of these findings for term-limited legislatures are stark, particularly in an era of seemingly ever
increasing partisan polarization. The noble goal of electing a more civic-minded legislature with the public’s best
interests at heart does not appear readily achievable under term limits, contrary to reformers expectations. Term limits
have made legislating less about policymaking and more of an exercise in political ambition, only serving to
exacerbate the same concerns that led to their original implementation. 
This article is based on the paper, ‘Term Limits and Collaboration Across the Aisle: An Analysis of Bipartisan
Cosponsorship in Term Limited and Non-Term Limited State Legislatures’, in State Politics & Policy Quarterly.
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